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Abstract: We present an active anti-latching system for superconducting nanowire single-photon
detectors. We experimentally test it against a bright-light attack, previously used to compromise
security of quantum key distribution. Although our system detects continuous blinding, the
detector is shown to be partially blindable and controllable by specially tailored sequences of
bright pulses. Improvements to the countermeasure are suggested.
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1. Introduction
More than 30 years have passed since the method of transferring secret information based on
the mechanisms of quantum physics, called quantum cryptography, was proposed [1]. Since
then, quantum cryptography has significantly developed: various protocols for transmitting
key information have been created, various schemes for organizing quantum key distribution
systems have been proposed, which have led to the creation of the first commercial quantum key
distribution (QKD) systems [2]. At the same time, the development of QKD systems to the level
of a commercial product has stimulated research into potential vulnerabilities of these systems to
hacking attacks. It has been proved that QKD using perfect devices is secure [3, 4]. Potential
vulnerabilities depend on the technical realization of a specific QKD system and are exploited
through its imperfection and operating aspects of the employed electronic and optical components.
Searching and eliminating potential vulnerabilities in implementations are crucial for practical
security. One of these vulnerable elements of a QKD system is a single-photon detector, of which
the most commonly used types are single-photon avalanche diodes (SPADs) and superconducting
nanowire single-photon detectors (SNSPDs). There are a number of attacks on QKD systems
that use imperfections of the single-photon detector (for example, blinding, high-power damage,
time-shift, after-gate attacks, superlinearity, efficiency mismatch and calibration loopholes [5]).
A special place is occupied by the group of faked-state attacks on single-photon detectors
in QKD systems [6]. When implementing this type of attack, the eavesdropper Eve prepares
optical pulses using a special algorithm and sends them to Bob (the nodes of the quantum key
distribution system are usually referred to as Alice and Bob). With the successful implementation
of this type of attack, the bases and states of the quantum states detected by Bob always coincide
with the corresponding bases and states of the optical signals prepared by Eve, and the number
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of errors in Bob’s key does not increase. After that, Eve can just listen to error correction and
privacy amplification of the key made by Alice and Bob and can then apply the same operations
to her key. As a result, Eve obtains a secret key identical to that of Alice and Bob. One of the
options for implementing a faked-state attack is the blinding attack [7–9]. A demonstration of
hacking a QKD system using this approach was carried out in [8].
Apart from SPADs, SNSPDs are widely used in QKD systems. Compared to SPADs, the
SNSPD can have a higher detection efficiency (above 90%), a lower dark-count rate, a higher
maximum count rate and a lower jitter [10–13]. A blinding attack on the SNSPDs in a QKD
system may be successful because of an imperfection of the SNSPD operation allowing it to be
controlled by bright light [14, 15]. The potential vulnerabilities of the SNSPD are a latching
effect and an ability to respond to bright optical pulses [14]. The behavior of an SNSPD with a
shunt resistor that prevents the latching effect has also been investigated [15]. In that experiment,
a light pattern that achieves temporary blinding without latching has been simulated, showing
that a successful blinding attack on QKD may still be possible.
Here we discuss the development of a countermeasure against the blinding attack for a
QKD system with SNSPDs. The main goal of our work is to create a perfectly secure single-
photon detector. Our testing is therefore focused on revealing any residual imperfections in
the countermeasure, which if found shall lead to its redesign. The countermeasure consists of
hardware and software that form together an automatic anti-latching reset system in the bias supply
of the SNSPD, presented in Sec. 2. We test this countermeasure against a bright-light attack in
Sec. 3. While the present implementation is found to allow a certain degree of controllability by
Eve and thus fails the test, an improvement of the design is possible, as we discuss in Sec. 4. We
conclude in Sec. 5.
2. Detector design and operation
Our SNSPD is based on a superconducting current-carrying NbN film deposited on a polished Si
wafer, with a superconducting transition critical temperature Tc ≈ 11 K. To achieve the operating
temperature we use a Gifford McMahon cryocooler with a base temperature of 2.5 K. The
4 nm thick NbN film is patterned into a 100 nm wide nanowire meander covering an area of
7 × 7 µm2 [16].
Figure 1 shows a schematic current-voltage (I–V) curve of the SNSPD. The operating point of
the detector (point A) is typically at a bias current Ib slightly below the critical current Ic . The
typical value of Ib = (0.90–0.95)Ic . In this range, a high detection efficiency is combined with a
low dark count rate. The SNSPD in our experiment has a system detection efficiency of 26.5%
and the dark count rate of 50 Hz at Ib = 22 µA.
When the bias current flows through the superconducting nanowire and the nanowire absorbs
a photon, a local disturbance of the superconducting state in the nanowire appears. As a result, a
normal domain is formed. Joule heating by the bias current makes the domain grow rapidly to
the width of the nanowire [17]. Because the normal-conducting nanowire has a high resistance,
the bias current is reduced (point B). After that, superconductivity in the nanowire is recovered
and the bias current returns to its original value (point A). The amplitude of the SNSPD response
pulse is typically 1 mV (Fig. 1). Its width is ∼ 7 ns and depends on the kinetic inductance of the
nanowire and thus on the size and shape of the detector.
After absorbing an optical pulse, the SNSPD may enter a latched state. The dissipation of the
energy received by the detector from the optical pulse takes some time, which increases with
the energy of the pulse. During the energy dissipation, the operating point of the detector drifts
from point B to point C (with the normal domain continuing to grow in size). This leads to an
increase in the power output and the further self-heating of the detector. This process happens
with all types of bias sources; however, its parameters substantially depend on the type of the
bias source used. A typical current source connected to a high impedance load as is the case
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Fig. 1. A schematic current-voltage (I–V) characteristic of the SNSPD. Point A is the
SNSPD operating point. Point B is a metastable state. Point C is a latched state. The blue
arrows show the evolution of the operating point towards the latched state.
here may develop several volts output voltage before it clamps. A stable state may thus arise in
which the nanowire is blocked by the long normal domain and the superconducting state cannot
be restored without externally reducing the bias current to zero. In this latched state, the SNSPD
has low sensitivity and cannot detect single photons. However it can still operate in a bolometric
mode, where its response may depend on the absorbed optical power. This property has been
used to carry out the blinding attack [14]. In order to avoid the latching effect, one can install a
shunt resistor [18], for example on the cable between the SNSPD and the bias tee [15]. However,
it has been shown that Eve can conduct a successful blinding attack even in this case, blinding
the detector temporarily without achieving the latched state [15].
To design a countermeasure against detector control, we have considered different approaches.
We have ruled out those that involve adding components to the optical scheme, because any
complication of the QKD system leads to the possible emergence of new attacks. One often
suggested countermeasure of this kind is the addition of a beamsplitter and a monitoring detector
that watches for abnormally strong input light [9]. This countermeasure has extra drawbacks.
Firstly, it leads to an additional loss in the signal path and thus lower QKD performance. Secondly,
the sensitivity range of a classical photodetector is very different from that of the single-photon
detector and may be insufficient to detect Eve’s control signal. Should a single-photon detector
be used as the monitoring detector, its security problems would apply. We have thus decided to
leave the optical scheme intact, and monitor for a correct single-photon operation of the SNSPD
by amending the electronics of its bias current supply.
The power supply consists of a highly stable current source and our addition, auto-reset system
(Fig. 2). The latter consists of a CMOS-based electronic switch (ADG619) and a voltmeter.
The voltmeter measures the voltage V across the SNSPD through the bias tee (Mini-Circuits
ZFBT-4R2GW+) and the coaxial cable leading into the cryostat. The setting of the current source
and state of the switch are controlled by software running in a microcontroller.
The SNSPD response is amplified to∼ 200 mV by two integrated amplifiers (Infineon BGA427)
with a net gain of ∼ 40 dB and is fed to a high-speed voltage comparator (ADCMP601) with a
threshold level of 60 mV. In normal detector operation, a positive transition (low to high logic
level) at the comparator output is regarded as a photon detection or ‘click’. We can observe the
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Fig. 2. Experimental setup. The SNSPD is cooled to 2.5 K and irradiated through
single-mode fiber shown in red. The faked-state generator consists of two laser diodes (LD)
producing linearly polarised 1550 nm light and controlled by a pulse generator (PG). The
power and polarisation of each can be adjusted with variable optical attenuators (VOA)
and polarisation controllers (PC). The laser power is divided by the 50 : 50 beam splitter
(BS) with one part fed into an optical power meter and the other sent to the SNSPD. The
electronics consist of a power supply, a readout system and a bias tee with a bandwidth of
0.1 to 4200 MHz. The power supply consists of a highly stable and low-noise current supply
and an auto-reset system, which includes an electronic switch and a fast voltmeter. The
SNSPD response is amplified to ∼ 200 mV by two integrated amplifiers with a gain ∼ 40 dB
and a bandwidth from 100 MHz to 3 GHz, and is fed to a high-speed voltage comparator.
We observed the amplified SNSPD response and the comparator output with an oscilloscope
of 4 GHz bandwidth.
amplified SNSPD response and the comparator output with an oscilloscope (Rohde & Schwarz
RTO1044).
The auto-reset system allows us to avoid the SNSPD latching. The switch is normally open.
The SNSPD voltage V is measured with a sampling rate of 10 kHz, thereafter digitally low-pass
filtered resulting in an effective sampling rate ∼ 100 Hz. If the SNSPD latches, V becomes higher
than an auto-reset trigger threshold (set at 20 mV in our experiment). The above low-pass filtering
and threshold voltage have been tuned to avoid the auto-reset triggering by voltmeter electronic
noise and by voltage fluctuations produced by normal photon counting pulses. When the
auto-reset procedure is triggered, the switch is closed. The recovery time of the superconducting
state of the nanowire depends on many parameters (for example on the power of the optical
pulse Ib and the topology of the detector). Therefore, we had an adjustable wait time in a range
of 0.1–10 s (in our case this time was set at 1 s). After this time the switch is opened, which
completes the cycle. Any triggering of the auto-reset procedure should be time-stamped by a
logging system that has not been included in the present experiment but since been implemented
in a commercial SNSPD device [19]. This would allow the QKD system to discard a portion of
the raw key that may have been affected by the blinding attack.
3. Does the auto-reset system thwart the blinding attack?
3.1. Test setup
In order to test the countermeasure, we have used a faked-state generator capable of forming
pulse sequences of varying time and optical power, as well as continuous-wave light (Fig. 2). We
use two semiconductor laser diodes at 1550 nm (Gooch & Housego AA1406). A pulse generator
(Highland Technology P400) controls the lasers, which emit rectangular optical pulses with a
peak power Pp , width τ, and pulse repetition rate f . The laser radiation is sent to a 50:50 beam
splitter. To measure Pp of each laser, its integral power Pi is measured by an optical power
meter (Ophir VEGA with sensor PD300-IRG-V1). Then Pp = Pi/(τ f ). We control Pp of each
4
Fig. 3. Response of SNSPD to light. The oscillogram shows analog signal after the
amplifiers under a bright peak power (1.5 mW), 100 ns long optical pulse. The inset shows
a single-photon response. The horizontal line denotes comparator threshold level. Region A
corresponds to the heating of the superconducting strip, region B to the metastable state, and
region C to slow recovery of the superconducting state. The traces shown are a superposition
of many individual oscillograms, taken in a persistence display mode.
laser by a variable optical fiber attenuator (EXFO FVA-600B). Since the SNSPD is sensitive to
polarisation [20], a polarisation controller (Thorlabs FPC030) is used to ensure the maximum
response of the detector to the incident light power.
3.2. Latching threshold
To study how the auto-reset system reacts to the blinding attack, we have observed the SNSPD
response to optical pulses of different duration τ, peak power Pp, and repetition rate f . We
varied f in the range 1 to 107 Hz, Pp from 10−11 to 2 × 10−4 W, and τ from 1 ns to 1/ f (i.e.,
from 1 ns wide pulses to c.w. illumination). Figure 3 shows a response to a bright 100 ns optical
pulse that does not cause the latching. A single-photon response is shown for comparison in the
inset. Note that the electrical response pulse is substantially longer than the bright optical pulse,
and its second half contains high-frequency peaks. The higher Pp is, the longer the response
pulse becomes.
This response to the bright optical pulse can be explained by the evolution of the detector’s
operating point (see Fig. 1). Initially, the detector is at point A. When the optical pulse hits it,
it passes to point B. This happens regardless of the optical power, as long as photons trigger
the formation of normally-conducting nanowire. The transition from A to B proceeds along a
50 Ω load line, because the bias source impedance at higher frequencies above 10 MHz (which
correspond to characteristic frequencies of the single-photon response) is determined by the
impedance of the signal back-end, consisting of a 50 Ω coaxial cable and a matched amplifier
input impedance.
In the case of a small (single-photon) optical pulse, the detector returns to point A after a
short time determined by the kinetic inductance of the nanowire. However, in the case of a
high absorbed power, the temperature of the electron subsystem of the superconductor increases
substantially above Tc and takes additional time to cool down. The state of the detector begins
to shift towards point C. This is because the output impedance of the bias source at a constant
current is very high (i.e., it is a current source at low frequencies). Therefore, over time the source
impedance gradually increases from 50 Ω towards infinity, which leads to a gradual decrease
5
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Fig. 4. Minimum optical pulse width that leads to latching at different pulse repetition
rates and peak powers. When the pulse width is under the plotted value, the latching is not
observed and the auto-reset system does not trigger. This regime may be exploited by Eve.
of the slope of the load curve and, accordingly, a shift of the operating point from B to C. This
slow transition manifests as a smooth increase in the amplitude of the response in region A in
Fig. 3. An additional factor is Joule heating in the normally-conducting portion of the nanowire.
As the operating point shifts from B to C, the Joule heat generated continuously increases. If
it exceeds the thermal power removed by dissipation from the normally conducting region, the
process becomes irreversible and the detector reaches the latched state (point C), where it will
remain until it is externally reset to the superconducting state. The auto-reset system registers a
control attempt only after the detector has latched after a considerable time (∼ 10 ms).
If the absorbed optical energy is insufficient for latching the detector, the temperature of its
electronic subsystem decreases and, at some point, the heated nanowire goes from the normal
state to a metastable one in which both the superconducting phase and the normal phase of the
superconductor co-exist along the length of the nanowire [18]. In this mode, radio frequency
generation is observed, which appears in Fig. 3 as sharp peaks in region B. Next, the nanowire
continues to cool and relatively slowly enters the superconducting state, which corresponds
to region C of Fig. 3. The shape of the electrical pulse strongly depends on the specific
implementation of the bias and amplifier circuits.
For studying the latching effect, we have fixed Pp and f . We then slowly increase τ until the
detector starts latching and the auto-reset system triggers. Figure 4 shows this latching boundary
for different f and Pp . The last point with the maximum τ on each curve is c.w. power incident on
the detector (except the 10 MHz curve where we did not reach this point because of a limitation
of our PG). In our detector, latching appears at ∼ 60 pW c.w. optical power.
As this data shows, our auto-reset system is not always able to register a blinding pulse. If Eve
uses optical pulses of power P < Pp(τ, f ), then her presence may not be noticed.
3.3. Faked-state attack on QKD
The next step towards the faked-state attack is to demonstrate that Eve may induce clicks
conditioned on Bob’s basis choice [7, 9]. Let’s assume the QKD system uses a Bennett-Brassard
1984 (BB84) protocol [1] with polarisation encoding, an active basis choice and two detectors at
Bob [21, 22]. For it, we have devised a pulse sequence shown in Fig. 5. First, Eve sends a bright
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Fig. 5. Faked state consisting of a sequence of pulses. The pulsesÀ blind the SNSPD.
Á sharpens the falling edge of the nanowire recovery response.Â is an ‘inverted trigger’
whose absence induces a click in the detector, whereas its presence keeps it blinded. In our
experiment,À andÁ are generated by LD1 andÂ by LD2.
optical pulseÀ about 100 ns long, with polarisation orthogonal to both bases used in the system,
which ensures it is always equally split between Bob’s detectors. Its power should be sufficient
to temporarily blind Bob’s detectors but not lead to their latching. Then, when the detector
response is decreasing, another shorter ∼ 4 ns pulseÁ is applied. The latter pulse induces
a fast recovery of the superconducting state of the nanowire. We have noticed that restoring
the operating point of the SNSPD takes much longer after application of high optical power,
compared to a small single-photon-like signal (see Fig. 3). This can be explained by a constant
production of Joule heat in the normal region of the nanowire. If a small optical pulseÁ is sent
to the slowly recovering detector, its operating point on the I–V curve instantly shifts along the
50 Ω load line, which leads to a decrease in the Joule heat produced and a faster recovery. The
energy ofÁ has to be chosen carefully, owing to a delicate balance between the decrease of the
Joule heat and the additional absorbed optical power.
Just before the detector response is about to cross below the comparator threshold, an ‘inverted
trigger’ 10 ns pulseÂ is sent, its polarisation being orthogonal to Eve’s measurement result of
Alice’s photon. Immediately after it, a new blinding pulseÀ follows, starting the next faked-state
cycle. If Bob’s measurement basis differs from that of Eve,Â splits evenly between Bob’s
detectors, blinds them and prevents them from clicking. We have simulated this regime with
our single SNSPD, see Fig. 6(a). If Bob’s measurement basis matches Alice’s,Â impinges on
Bob’s detector orthogonal to Eve’s measurement, also preventing it from clicking [Fig. 6(b)].
However the other Bob’s detector receives little power determined by an extinction ratio of
Bob’s receiver (we have simulated 23 dB in our experiment), continues to recover, crosses the
comparator threshold, and clicks [Fig. 6(c)]. Thus the basis and bit value of Bob’s registered
clicks always matches those of Eve, making the attack possible [7–9].
Detector control demonstrated in our test is far from ideal. The click probability in the
mismatched basis [Fig. 6(a)] is non-zero, and in the matched basis is less than 1. However the
imperfect click probabilities might not prevent the attack [23, 24]. The controlled click has a
significant jitter, apparent in the oscilloscope trace in Fig. 6(c). If this jitter is larger than Bob’s
bit slot in the QKD system under attack, this may be a problem for Eve. The initial blinding pulse
À causes a simultaneous click in Bob’s detectors. If its timing is accepted as a valid detection, a
correctly implemented QKD system would assign a random bit value to it, which would increase
the QBER under attack. To mitigate this, Eve would need to chain multiple controlled clicks
under a single long blinding sequence of faked states. Our faked state structure should allow
this (note that the responses to the first and second pulseÀ in Fig. 6 seem to be highly similar),
however we have not verified longer sequences experimentally. Finally the faked-state pulse
sequence will need to be modified for implementations other than polarisation-encoding QKD.
These are just a few technical challenges Eve would face when implementing a full attack.
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Fig. 6. Proof-of-principle of a faked-state blinding attack. The oscillograms show the
response of a single SNSPD illuminated with pulse sequences that simulate those Bob’s
detectors would receive during the attack. (a) Bob’s basis choice does not match Eve’s. Both
Bob’s detectors receive half the power ofÂ, and neither of them clicks. (b) Bob’s basis
choice matches Eve’s. One of his detectors receives almost all ofÂ and does not click.
(c) The other Bob’s detector receives a small fraction of the power ofÂ (here we have
simulated 23 dB extinction ratio), and produces a click with a significant probability. The
traces shown are a superposition of many individual oscillograms, taken in a persistence
display mode.
4. Suggestions for improving countermeasures
The objective of this study has been evaluating our security countermeasure. The detector control
demonstrated is imperfect and presents Eve challenges in building her attack. Nevertheless
we conclude that our countermeasure in its present form has profoundly failed the quality test.
Indeed, how could the security of QKD be guaranteed by a proof if the detector is still blindable
for a significant fraction of its operation time, and also controllable to a significant extent? These
detector properties would be virtually impossible to account for in a security proof, necessitating
a further development of the countermeasure [25].
One easy modification of the present countermeasure should be considered. In the normal
photon counting operation, the comparator output is in the high logic state for less than 20 ns
(see inset in Fig. 3). However under our demonstrated attack, it remains high for a much longer
continuous time (see Fig. 6). This condition should be detected and become an additional input
to the QKD system, indicating to it that a part of the key may have been compromised and should
be discarded.
5. Conclusion
We have developed an active anti-latching system for SNSPDs. The latching effect, previously
a security vulnerability for QKD, is easily managed using this system. However, we have also
found that we can still manipulate the single-photon detector to a large extent, through application
of pulsed bright light. Since our goal is to create ultimately an attack-proof detector, the partial
controllability is not acceptable. To further develop our countermeasure, it is necessary to
monitor the comparator pulse shape and implement post-processing key extraction that correctly
processes occasional alarm activations.
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